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Abstract. Satellite-based quantum terminals are a feasible way to extend the reach
of quantum communication protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to the
global scale. To that end, prior demonstrations have shown QKD transmissions from
airborne platforms to receivers on ground, but none have shown QKD transmissions
from ground to a moving aircraft, the latter scenario having simplicity and flexibility
advantages for a hypothetical satellite. Here we demonstrate QKD from a ground
transmitter to a receiver prototype mounted on an airplane in flight. We have
specifically designed our receiver prototype to consist of many components that are
compatible with the environment and resource constraints of a satellite. Coupled with
our relocatable ground station system, optical links with distances of 3–10 km were
maintained and quantum signals transmitted while traversing angular rates similar to
those observed of low-Earth-orbit satellites. For some passes of the aircraft over the
ground station, links were established within 10 s of position data transmission, and
with link times of a few minutes and received quantum bit error rates typically ≈3–5 %,
we generated secure keys up to 868 kb in length. By successfully generating secure keys
over several different pass configurations, we demonstrate the viability of technology
that constitutes a quantum receiver satellite payload and provide a blueprint for future
satellite missions to build upon.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] establishes cryptographic keys between two
distant parties in a way that is cryptanalytically unbreakable. Ground based
implementations of QKD using optical fiber links are limited to distances of a few
hundred kilometers due to absorption losses, which scale exponentially with distance,
leading to insufficient signal-to-noise [3–5]. Alternatively, free space links have been
demonstrated over ground with varying distances, both in stationary [6–10] and
moving [11–13] configurations. But despite losses due to geometric effects scaling
quadratically with distance, the addition of atmospheric absorption and turbulence,
and the necessity of having clear line of sight, limit terrestrial free-space transmissions
to, also, a few hundred kilometers.
Much greater distances could be spanned in free-space transmissions outside
Earth’s atmosphere. Utilizing orbiting satellites therefore has potential to allow
the establishment of global QKD networks, with “quantum” satellites acting as
intermediaries. Such satellites could operate as untrusted nodes linking two ground
stations simultaneously [14, 15], or trusted nodes connecting any two ground stations
on Earth at different times [16–22]. The majority of such analyses propose a quantum
downlink, where photons are generated at the satellite and transmitted to receivers on
the ground. Since 2010, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) has studied the proposed
Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) [23], where a mission concept was
developed in partnership with COM DEV (now Honeywell Aerospace). This concept,
in contrast to many other missions, proposes a quantum uplink, placing the receiver on
the satellite while keeping the quantum source at the ground station.
Under similar conditions, the uplink configuration has a lower key generation
rate than the downlink, owing to atmospheric turbulence affecting the beam path
earlier in the propagation. Nevertheless, comprehensive theoretical comparative
study of QKD under uplink and downlink conditions—which included the effects
of atmospheric turbulence, absorption, beam propagation, optical component losses,
detector characteristics, noise contributions, and representative pointing and collection
capabilities at a hypothetical satellite—concluded that an uplink approach is viable, with
the reduction in generated key bits (compared to downlink) being less than one order
of magnitude [24]. Importantly, an uplink also possesses a number of advantages over a
downlink, including relative simplicity of the satellite design, not requiring high-rate true
random number generators, relaxed requirements on data processing and storage (only
the photon reception events need be considered, which are many orders of magnitude
fewer than the source events), and the flexibility of being able to incorporate and explore
various different quantum source types with the same receiver apparatus (which would
have major associated costs were the source located on the satellite, as for downlink).
Recently, China launched a quantum science satellite which aims to perform many
quantum experiments with optical links between space and ground [25, 26]. However
its exact capabilities are unverified as no details or results have been published at this
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time.
Demonstrations of QKD with moving and airborne platforms take important
steps to verifying the readiness of quantum technology, and the supporting classical
technology, for deployment within a satellite payload. To date, however, reported
demonstrations of QKD with aircraft have operated exclusively in the downlink
configuration [11, 12], where the quantum states are generated and transmitted from
the aircraft to a receiver at a stationary ground location. Here we demonstrate QKD
uplink to a receiver on a moving aircraft. Our apparatuses incorporate coarse- and
fine-pointing systems necessary to establish and maintain optical link, quantum source
and measurement components that conduct polarization-encoded QKD, and suitable
post-processing algorithms to extract secure key. The results show good performance
at the same angular rates exhibited by low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellites.
Our QKD receiver makes extensive use of components custom-designed according
to the mass, volume, power, thermal, and vacuum operating environment requirements
of systems to be embedded in a satellite payload—many components are already space
suitable, and others have a clear path to flight. In a recent study, conducted with the
University of Toronto Institute for Aerospace Studies Space Flight Laboratory (UTIAS
SFL), a realistic satellite concept was developed, incorporating the space-ready receiver
apparatus demonstrated here, integrated into the flight-proven NEMO-150 [27] micro-
satellite bus (see below). This, together with our airborne operational demonstration,
illustrates the technological advancements made towards the development of a space-
suitable QKD receiver, and highlights the feasibility and technological readiness of an
uplink QKD satellite.
2. Apparatuses and Methods
2.1. Concept
The apparatuses for our demonstration consist of a QKD source and transmitter, located
at a ground station near the airstrip of Smiths Falls–Montague Airport, and a QKD
receiver, located on a Twin Otter research aircraft from the National Research Council
of Canada. Optical links were only attempted at night, to limit optical noise. One
systems-test day-time flight was conducted (where the optical links were not attempted),
followed by night-time flights.
Two night-time flights were conducted, each two hours duration and consisting
of several passes of varying trajectories. Optical links were established using tracking
feedback to two-axis motors, guided by strong beacon lasers (at a wavelength different
from the quantum signal) and an imaging camera, at each of the two sites. The QKD
signals produced by the source were guided through a telescope on the ground and
pointed to the receiver on the aircraft. There the QKD signal polarizations and times-of-
arrival were recorded for later correlation and processing to complete the QKD protocol
and extract the key.
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Figure 1: Flight paths for the 7 km arc and line, followed from left to right. The star
indicates the location of the ground station at Smith Falls–Montague Airport. The
inner portions represent where the quantum link was active. Photo produced using
GPSVisualizer.com, map data c© 2016 Google, imagery c© 2016 Cnes/Spot Image,
DigitalGlobe, Landsat, New York GIS, USDA Farm Service Agency.
We focused on two path types: arcs with (approximately) constant radius around
the ground station, and straight lines past the ground station. For straight line paths,
the distance we quote is the minimum. Over the two nights we performed 14 passes with
nominal distances of 3 km, 5 km, 7 km, and 10 km, in both line and arc configurations,
at an altitude of ≈1.6 km above sea level—see, for example, Fig. 1 for the flight path of
an arc at 7 km radius. For this flight mission concept, a sequence of GPS coordinates
was calculated for each flight, with the start angle relative to the ground station and the
distance were used as input. These coordinates were transferred to the flight software of
the aircraft by the pilots. We developed a decision tree such that, based on the observed
performance of each pass, we could immediately select an appropriate course of action
(e.g. to perform troubleshooting or collect data under different conditions). That a
mission concept such as this is viable shows that a similar mission concept, appropriate
for an orbiting satellite receiver, can realistically be achieved.
2.2. Source and Transmitter
Our QKD source is a significantly improved version of a previous-generation
apparatus [28], implementing BB84 with decoy states [29] at 400 MHz. Weak coherent
pulses at 785 nm wavelength are generated by combining a narrow-band 1590 nm
continuous-wave (CW) laser (L1) with 1550 nm triggered-pulsing laser (L2) through
sum frequency generation in a periodically poled magnesium oxide (PPMgO) waveguide
(see Fig. 2). For each pulse, one of three intensity levels is chosen: signal, decoy, or
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Figure 2: Left, schematic diagram of the quantum source and transmitter apparatus.
AWG, arbitrary waveform generator; WDM, wavelength division multiplexer; PBS,
polarizing beam splitter; OA, optical attenuator; F, band-pass filter; PT, polarization
tomography; TT, time tagger. Other acronyms and details given in the text. The red
border indicates components that are mounted on the motors. Right, ground station
located at Smiths Falls–Montague airport, showing (right-to-left) the trailer where the
source is located, motor mount with transmitter telescope attached, Wi-Fi antenna, and
calibration telescope.
vacuum, with probabilities of 80 %, 14 %, and 6 %, respectively. Signal and decoy levels
are generated using a fast electro-optical intensity modulator (IM) calibrated to emit
µ ≈ 0.5 and ν ≈ 0.1 mean photon number at the entrance of the transmitter telescope,
respectively. The vacuum state is made by suppressing the laser trigger.
Each of the four BB84 polarizations—horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D), and
anti-diagonal (A)—are imposed using two electro-optical phase modulators (PMs), each
in one arm of a balanced Mach-Zehnder polarization interferometer. With a balanced
input (D), the PMs can address any point on the circle through D, right-circular (R),
A, and left-circular (L). A subsequent unitary rotation takes these to D, H, A, and
V, respectively. The intensity and polarization states are generated according to a
randomized sequence that repeats every 1000 pulses. Although this is insecure, it is
sufficient for our demonstration, while upgrading to a fully random sequence (e.g., given
by a quantum random number generator) is straightforward and a suitable system has
been identified.
Pulse intensities are measured locally through the weak output of an optical fiber
splitter (90:10) connected to a silicon avalanche photodiode (Si-APD) operating in
Geiger mode with active quenching. The bulk of the pulse power is guided from the
source to the transmitter through single-mode optical fiber. The beam passes through
a 785 nm band-pass (3 nm bandwidth) filter (to impede Trojan-horse attacks [30]) and
then a 75:25 beam splitter. We employ a polarization correction system to undo the
unknown unitary rotation applied by the single-mode fiber—the reflected 25 % of pulses
undergo characterization, while the remaining 75 % of pulses pass through a triplet of
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wave plates (WPs) in motorized rotation stages that apply a compensation operation
to the states, and are finally transmitted through a 12 cm diameter Sky-Watcher BK
1206AZ3 refractive telescope.
The polarization characterization subsystem consists of two beam paths, where each
path passes through a port of a rotating chopper wheel that contains linear polarizers.
The linear polarizers are each calibrated to project onto the H, V, D, or A state—
however, one of the two beam paths contains a quarter-wave plate just prior to the
chopper wheel, thereby facilitating projections onto a tomographically complete set of
three polarization bases: H/V, D/A, and R/L. The actual state any given photon is
projected to depends on which blade of the wheel is open at the time the photon passes
through (the rotation of the wheel is also recorded).
The two beams are each coupled into fiber and directed to Si-APDs. With near
real-time analysis of source and detection data (performed on per-second integrated
counts), we obtain tomographic reconstructions, for each of the generated polarization
states, of the states at the transmitter after the rotation applied by the fiber. We
then optimize the compensating wave plate triplet (a sequence of quarter-, half-, and
quarter-wave plate) to maximize the fidelity of the states expected after compensation
with the nominally generated states. The optimal positions are given to the motorized
stages, applying the (rotated) wave plates to pulses that are then transmitted through
the telescope towards the receiver.
During our airborne trials, the QKD source optics and electronics, as well as
computers for data recording and pointing feedback, were located inside of a trailer to
maintain thermal and humidity stability. The transmitter pointing stages, polarization
characterization optics, and telescope were located just outside the trailer, with cabling
running through a small window. Equipped with an electric generator, our ground
station is relocatable and self-sufficient.
2.3. Receiver
At the receiver (Fig. 3), the signal is collected by a Tele Vue NP101is refractive
telescope with a 10 cm aperture, and coupled into a sequence of custom components
developed under contract with the Canadian Space Agency [31]. First of these is
a fine-pointing unit (FPU), developed with Institut National d’Optique (INO) and
Neptec Design Group, which guides both the quantum and beacon signals with a fast-
steering mirror (FSM). Inside the FPU, a dichroic mirror separates the quantum and
beacon signals—the beacon is reflected towards a quad-cell photo-sensor (QS), providing
position feedback to a fine-pointing controller (FPC) that guides the fast-steering mirror
in a closed loop [32]. The FPU, measuring 330 mm× 240 mm× 95 mm and 2.61 kg, has
a ±0.3◦ field of view.
The collected quantum beam is guided through a 50 µm pinhole, acting as a spatial-
mode filter [33], followed by a pair of 785 nm (3 nm bandwidth) spectral filters. It
then passes into a custom integrated optical assembly (IOA) developed with INO,
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Figure 3: Left, schematic diagram of the receiver apparatus. F, band-pass filters; WB,
wide-field beacon (produced by the IRL). Other acronyms and details given in the
text. The red border indicates components that are mounted on the motors. Right,
receiver apparatus facing out the port-side door of the NRC Twin Otter research aircraft,
showing (clockwise) the telescope, beacon assembly, motor mount, IRL, Wi-Fi antenna,
and FPC (behind). Other components not visible (primarily electronics) are mounted
in front of the seats seen at the left of the picture.
containing a passive-basis-choice polarization analysis module with a 50:50 beam splitter
and polarizing beam splitters. The IOA, measuring 48.2 mm× 56.8 mm× 120 mm and
129 g, produces four beams coupled into multimode fibers, corresponding to the four
BB84 measurement states (H, V, D, and A) with state contrasts between 532:1 and
2577:1.
The four IOA output fibers are guided to a detector module (DM) containing four
Excelitas Technologies SLiK Si-APD detectors operating in Geiger mode with passive
quenching. The DM measures 30 mm× 127 mm× 143 mm and 516 g, and operates at
2.3 W steady state (including thermoelectric cooling of detector active areas to −20 ◦C)
to give a detection efficiency of ≈45 %, biased 28 V above breakdown.
The detectors trigger low-voltage differential signalling pulses which are measured
at a control and data processing unit (CDPU) based on Xiphos Systems Corporation’s
Q7 processor card (recently flown on GHGSat [34]) with a custom daughterboard. The
CDPU utilizes an ARM Cortex-A9 processor and measures 25 mm× 107 mm× 118 mm,
129 g, drawing 4.5 W while operating. A field-programmable gate array embedded in the
CDPU is programmed to implement time-tagging of detection pulses with a resolution
of 78 ps, while data storage, communication, and processing software running in the
Linux operating system implement the receiver-side QKD protocol.
The receiver telescope was mounted facing out the cabin door on the port side of
the aircraft, and flown with the door removed. The electronics and computers were
located six feet forward in the aircraft cabin, and optical fibers and cables conducted
signals between the electronics and the receiver telescope and pointing equipment.
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2.4. Acquisition and Calibration
The transmitter and receiver each have a beacon laser assembly (BLA) consisting of
three fiber launchers with fixed divergence angles of 0.74◦ and individual tip/tilt control.
These are mounted on each telescope and fed strong (≈40 mW) 850 nm laser light from
fiber-coupled beacon laser source (BLS) arrays located away from the telescopes. A
beacon camera (BC)—a 50 frame-per-second, 2 megapixel imaging camera with an
850 nm band-pass filter (10 nm bandwidth)—is also mounted to each telescope.
Each telescope is attached to a commercial two-axis motor system (transmitter:
ASA DDM85 Standard, receiver: FLIR PTU-D300E), providing first-stage “coarse”
pointing. When light at the beacon wavelength is visible as a bright spot on the camera
image, our custom pointing software (running on PCs at each site) controls the angular
speeds of the motors to minimize the deviation of the spot’s position from a calibrated
reference position. The control feedback loop incorporates the estimated angular speed
of the spot (based on position differences between recent images, taking into account
previous motor motions), a factor proportional to the spot’s current deviation, and
a factor proportional to the accumulated (integrated) spot deviations. The pointing
software operates as a state machine, and also includes a “coasting” state to handle
short drop-outs of the beacon signal, and “acquiring” and “searching” states to support
the initial acquisition of the beacon.
To achieve initial acquisition, we employ inertial navigation modules (INMs),
containing GPS receivers and attitude sensors, mounted to the telescopes. Each site
transmits their GPS location to the other site via a classical RF (Wi-Fi) link, and then
calculates the other site’s orientation relative to its own based on its local attitude data.
During initial testing, the INMs exhibited an attitude uncertainty of about ±2.5◦—
significantly larger than the 0.74◦ divergence of the beacon lasers. To mitigate this, we
turn on a bright infra-red light-emitting diode array (IRL) at the receiver with much
greater divergence (of order 80◦), allowing the transmitter to find, and point towards, the
receiver. Once the receiver sees the transmitter’s beacon spot in its camera image and
has moved to position, the IRL is switched off, and two-way beacon tracking continues
for the remainder of the pass.
A necessary practical feature of our transmitter and receiver apparatuses is that
they can be independently calibrated, as they would not be co-located prior to
establishing a link (much like for a satellite mission). To align each of the beacon
lasers with the quantum signal beam path, we first inject alignment laser power into
each telescope, and point the telescope towards a separate larger-diameter (≈20 cm)
telescope, located ≈20 m away, equipped with a camera imaging the far field. We then
observe the position of the beacon beams on the camera image, and adjust the tip and
tilt of each beacon fiber launcher to center its output over the signal spot. To calibrate
the reference position of the beacon camera at the transmitter and the collimation of
the transmitted quantum beam, we optimize the power received (using the alignment
laser injected into the transmitter telescope) at another telescope located at a sufficient
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distance ≈850 m down the runway. The receiver beacon camera, which has greater
tolerance due to the receiver’s fine-pointing unit, is calibrated using a corner cube
located ≈50 m away in the NRC hangar. These alignments were done prior to each
flight. These independent calibrations allowed link acquisition to begin immediately
upon the arrival of the airplane in the vicinity of the ground station.
3. Results
In total, seven of the 14 airplane passes over the ground station successfully established
a quantum signal link. Issues, including minor equipment failures (e.g., a loose beacon
camera lens) and accidental controller misconfigurations, particularly hampered link
establishment during the first night—two of the seven attempts were successful. These
issues were addressed during the intervening day, and the second night had considerably
better link establishment rate—five of seven attempts. (We attribute the two failures
on the second night—both attempted straight-line paths—to the fixed orientation of
the Wi-Fi transceiver at the aircraft being poor for this geometry, particularly at the
beginning of a pass.)
Secret key was extracted out of six of the seven successful passes. From data
collected during these passes, we observe the performance of the system at various
distances and with angular speeds. Circular-arc passes allowed us to demonstrate longer
duration of key exchange, compared to straight-line passes, as the receiver telescope held
a relatively constant position during the pass, making link establishment and pointing
easier. Straight line passes, however, are much more representative of a satellite passing
over a ground station, as they simulate the change in angular speed that would be
experienced during such a pass. The maximum angular rate is reached when the airplane
is closest to the ground station for that pass—the greatest maximum angular rate we
measured for our passes was 1.28 ◦/s at a distance of 3 km (arc). This angular rate
is consistent with overflying LEO spacecraft such as 0.72 ◦/s for a 600 km orbit, as
baselined for QEYSSat, or 1.2 ◦/s for the International Space Station (ISS).
Table 1 summarizes the seven passes where quantum signal was successfully
transmitted to the receiver aboard the aircraft. Passes typically lasted a few minutes,
with the aircraft travelling at 198 km/h to 259 km/h. To quantify pointing performance,
we define the typical pointing error as the measured distance of the beacon spot from
the calibrated reference point on the camera image, discarding times when the motors
had just begun tracking. The mean typical pointing error at the transmitter varied
from 0.001 33◦ to 0.0220◦ over the passes; at the receiver, it was 0.0630◦ to 0.126◦. The
receiver’s fine-pointing unit measured pointing errors similar to the pointing error of the
transmitter, between 0.002 39◦ to 0.0127◦, where the deviation was measured from the
centre of the quad-cell sensor. (These values are used in the link analysis model, below.)
Figure 4 shows observed results for two representative passes, including the motor
speed of the transmitter in the horizontal axis and link acquisition stages, the coarse- and
fine-pointing errors at the receiver, the calculated time of flight of the quantum signal
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Figure 4: Results for the 7 km arc pass (left) and the 7 km straight-line pass (right). a)
and e) show the speeds of the azimuthal (coarse) motor at the transmitter. The insets,
corresponding to the shaded portions, show the motor speed during initial acquisition,
with times t1 through t4 identifying establishment of the Wi-Fi link, identification of
the beacon spot, lock to the beacon spot, and first counts received, respectively. The
oscillation prior to this in a) is from a spiralling search state of the pointing software.
b) and f) show coarse- and fine-pointing performance at the receiver. Where there are
no coarse pointing data (e.g., at the beginning of a pass), no beacon spot was found
in the camera image. This corresponds with large fluctuations in the fine-pointing
deviation—in the absence of beacon light, the unit operates on electrical noise generated
at the quad cell. c) and g) show the estimated time of flight of the photons from the
transmitter to the receiver (used in event time-correlation), calculated from per-second
GPS coordinates at each site. The smooth curve in g) is particularly characteristic of
the straight-line pass, with a similar shape to that of a satellite pass. d) and e) show
the total detection rates at the receiver and the QBER of the signal.
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Table 1: Summary of data from passes where a quantum link was established. All times
are UTC. Except where indicated (*), secure key lengths incorporate finite-size effects.
Pass 5 km 7 km 5 km 3 km 3 km 7 km 10 km
arc 1 line arc 2 line arc arc arc
2016-09-21 2016-09-21 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22 2016-09-22
Parameter 2:57:45 3:30:45 1:15:23 2:19:33 2:24:45 2:42:16 2:57:42
Classical link duration [s] 288 172 352 34 170 210 289
Quantum link duration [s] 235 158 250 33 158 206 269
Mean speed [km/h] 208 200 198 236 216 259 212
Maximum angular speed [◦] 0.76 0.45 0.75 1.0 1.28 0.60 0.37
Transmitter pointing error (10−3)[◦] 22.0 4.85 1.33 3.42 2.91 1.58 2.82
Receiver pointing error (10−3)[◦] 125 126 63.0 86.5 89.8 78.6 87.2
Receiver fine-pointing error (10−3)[◦] 2.73 9.98 No data 2.62 2.39 3.01 12.7
Source QBER [%] 5.08 3.58 3.32 2.66 4.37 2.80 3.39
Signal QBER [%] 13.13 5.24 3.42 2.96 5.20 2.96 3.30
Decoy QBER [%] 19.54 11.1 6.13 6.35 7.93 5.97 8.46
Theoretical loss [dB] 52.1 41.6–44.8 28.1 33.3–35.1 30.9 32.1 39.9
Mean measured loss [dB] 48.0 51.1 34.5 39.5 34.4 39.4 42.6
Error correction efficiency 1.4 1.16 1.33 1.4 1.18 1.46 1.27
Signal-to-noise threshold 0 1500 2000 1000 1000 2000 2500
Sifted key length [bits] 152508 95710 5212446 853066 5102122 2348086 1175317
Secure key length [bits] None 9566* 867771 71648 44244 200297 70947
from the transmitter to the receiver, the rate of detections of all four DM channels
combined, and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the signal. There, the maximal
angular speed was about 0.5 ◦/s to 0.7 ◦/s during beacon pointing lock, after initial
acquisition.
The mean measured loss of the quantum link during the flights varied from 34.4 dB
to 51.1 dB. Our theoretical loss model [24] assumes a mid-latitude, rural atmospheric
model in summer with the ground station located 128 m above sea level and 5 km
visibility. Other model parameters include 43 % detector efficiency and receiver optical
transmittance of 59.7 % (determined from the measured properties of the receiver
prototype). We simulate the effect of atmospheric turbulence at our location using
Hufnagel–Valley parameterization of atmospheric conditions [35, 36], with a sea-level
turbulence strength of 1.7× 10−14 m−2/3 and high-altitude wind-speed of 21 m/s. The
measured pointing accuracy, aircraft altitude, and ground distance for each pass was
also used. The divergence angle of the quantum beam could not be measured during
the flight campaign. For the model we assume diffraction-limited divergence, resulting
in lower bound theoretical loss estimates. Indeed, in the experiment, a number of
passes were conducted with the transmitter intentionally slightly defocussed so as to
avoid saturating the detectors. Consequently, the experimental losses we observed are
generally higher than the theoretical losses. The difference between the theoretical loss
of an arc pass and the minimum theoretical loss of a line pass at the same nominal
distance is due to varying pointing accuracy experienced for each pass, as well as the
actual ground distance and altitude deviating from nominal.
For QKD analysis we utilize a signal-to-noise (SNR) filter [37], which assesses the
total counts in each 1 s frame of data and discards any frame with counts less than
a threshold, prior to distilling key bits. We choose thresholds between 1000 and 2500,
depending on the pass. Background detection rates at the beginning and end of the pass
are sufficiently low that those frames are discarded by the SNR filter. Some drop-outs
can be seen in Fig. 4h)—these frames are also discarded by the SNR filter.
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The source’s intrinsic QBER, as predicted by the polarization correction system,
varied between 2.66 % and 5.08 % for each pass. At the receiver, the FPU, IOA, and
fibers leading to the detectors were shielded with black cloth to minimize stray light
entering the detectors, leading to typical total background detection rates of ≈285 Hz.
The QBER measured at the receiver drops to a few percent upon optical link lock,
and rests at ≈50 % due to the random noise of background detections at all other times.
For passes where secure key was generated, the QBER measured at the receiver, after
the SNR filter, varied from 2.96 % to 5.24 %. The received QBER during the first night
flight was observed to be higher than for the second night, possibly due to an issue with
the wave plate motorized stage controller.
We generate secure key bits from the data collected during each pass using
algorithms tailored for the asymmetric processing resources that would be available
with a satellite platform [38]. These algorithms consist of source and receiver event
time-correlation (performed at the ground station), error correction utilizing low-density
parity check codes, and privacy amplification via reduced-Toeplitz-matrix two-universal
hashes. To ensure security, the uncertainty due to the finite number of samples used to
estimate link parameters must be taken into account. Of the six passes from which key
could be extracted, five yielded secure key including these finite-size effects (where we
use the common ten-standard-deviation heuristic to bound parameter estimates [39]).
The remaining pass had too few counts and could only generate secure key assuming no
finite-size effects.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
We have successfully demonstrated quantum key distribution to a satellite receiver
payload prototype on an aircraft moving at up to 259 km/h. Our pointing and
tracking system was able to establish and maintain an optical link with milli-degree
precision over 3 km to 10 km distances while BB84 decoy-state signals were sent across
the channel to the aircraft moving at the angular speeds of a LEO satellite. Our
custom fine-pointing system, IOA, DM, and CDPU, along with the other commercial
components, all performed in concert on the aircraft to generate secure keys, of tens to
hundreds of kilobits in length, in various flight scenarios, including the straight-line paths
approximating the apparent trajectory a LEO satellite. With source intrinsic QBER
typically 2 % to 4 % and post-processing algorithms representative of what would be
achievable with a satellite platform, we extracted finite-size secure key for many of the
tested passes.
The details of path-to-flight modifications necessary to construct space-suitable
versions of our receiver components varies. Some elements present on the CDPU
daughterboard, for example, will need to be replaced with radiation-hard equivalent
versions. Or, for the IOA, glues designed for low out-gassing must be used. Sensitivity
of the Si-APDs in the DM to proton radiation in orbit is of particular note, as such
radiation can significantly increase dark counts. However, strategies including cooling
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and thermal annealing [40], as well as laser annealing [41], are capable of mitigating
these effects, and a space suitable prototype DM implementing these strategies is being
developed.
DM
IOA FPU
BLA
CDPU
FPC
610mm
Figure 5: The UTIAS SFL NEMO-150 micro-satellite bus housing the quantum receiver
payload. Left, external view showing extended telescope and baffle. Right, cross-section
showing the possible placement of the main receiver payload components demonstrated
during this airborne QKD campaign. Images provided by UTIAS SFL.
For pointing to a satellite from the ground, initial acquisition will likely not have a
real-time classical communication link to exchange position data. In this case, however,
predictions of the satellite position at the time when a link is to be established can be
used, as the orbital trajectory of a satellite is predictable with far greater accuracy than
the flight path of an airplane. In this context, point-ahead may be necessary (depending
on the transmitter’s divergence) to ensure that the quantum beam is coincident with
the satellite when it arrives, owing to the satellite’s motion during the time of flight
of the optical signals. A fine-pointing system would likely also be required to achieve
sufficient accuracy over the significantly larger transmission distance. For the aircraft,
this was not necessary.
One advantage of the uplink approach is source flexibility. While we have
demonstrated only operation with a weak coherent pulse source here, we fully expect
that QKD using entangled photon pairs generated at the appropriate wavelength by, for
example, spontaneous parametric down-conversion will produce equivalent results under
a BBM92-style protocol [42], with one photon of each pair measured on the ground. To
support this, no aspect of the receiver prototype need be modified.
Our system demonstrates the viability of an uplink QKD satellite mission. The
core quantum components of a QKD satellite receiver have been demonstrated and
have clear path to inclusion in space-faring system. In particular, see Fig. 5 from a
recent study conducted with UTIAS SFL, which shows our receiver hardware—FPU,
FPC, IOA, DM, and CDPU—with minor modifications, cohesively integrated onto the
flight-proven NEMO-150 micro-satellite bus. With the feasibility of performing uplink
QKD with moving platforms well supported with satellite-ready hardware, QKD at the
global scale utilizing satellite uplinks is within reach.
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